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Abstract. Blockchain is a distributed ledger, which is protected against
malicious modifications by means of cryptographic tools, e.g. digital sig-
natures and hash functions. One of the most prominent applications of
blockchains is cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin. In this work, we consider
a particular attack on wallets for collecting assets in a cryptocurrency
network based on brute-force search attacks. Using Bitcoin as an ex-
ample, we demonstrate that if the attack is implemented successfully,
a legitimate user is able to prove that fact of this attack with a high
probability. We also consider two options for modification of existing
cryptocurrency protocols for dealing with this type of attacks. First, we
discuss a modification that requires introducing changes in the Bitcoin
protocol and allows diminishing the motivation to attack wallets. Sec-
ond, an alternative option is the construction of special smart-contracts,
which reward the users for providing evidence of the brute-force attack.
The execution of this smart-contract can work as an automatic alarm
that the employed cryptographic mechanisms, and (particularly) hash
functions, have an evident vulnerability.
Keywords: Blockchain · Cryptocurrency · Brute-force attack.
1 Introduction
Recently, peer-to-peer payment systems based on the blockchain technology, so-
called cryptocurrencies, attracted a significant deal of interest [1]. The crucial
feature of cryptocurrencies is their possibility to operate without a central au-
thority that governs the system. This becomes possible thanks to the use of
specific cryptographic tools inside blockchains, such as digital signatures and
hash functions [2]. This type of cryptographic primitives is based on so-called
one-way functions. These are believed to be straightforward to run on a conven-
tional computer but difficult (or practically impossible) to calculate in reverse [3].
For example, multiplying two large prime numbers is easy, but finding the prime
factors of a given product is hard. Existing algorithms based on such a paradigm
are known already more than 40 years, but their security remains unproven.
A particular element of blockchain is a cryptographic hash function, which is
a compressive transformation that takes a string of arbitrary length and reduces
? Supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (18-37-20033).
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it to one of predefined finite length. It is assumed that the task of inverting hash
function is extremely difficult for modern computers. Specifically, the mechanism
of hash functions enables achieving consensus in the concept know as proof-of-
work, which is used in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Another use-case for
hash functions in the Bitcoin network for additional security of wallets that are
used by network members for collecting assets.
However, the security status of cryptographic tools may change with time. In
particular, quantum computing, which is a tool for information processing with
the use of quantum phenomena such as superposition and entanglement, allows
solving particular classes of tasks more efficient than with the use of existing
classical algorithms. These tasks include integer factorization and discrete log-
arithm problems or searching for an unsorted database. From the viewpoint of
blockchain security [4], the latter can be used for achieving a quadratic speedup
in calculating the inverse hash function [5]. We note that the security of Bitcoin
from the viewpoint of attacks from quantum computers has been considered in
Ref. [6]. Large-scale quantum computers that enable to realize such an algorithm,
however, are not yet available. Meantime, significant efforts of the community
are concentrated on the distributed brute-force-type analysis of hash function,
for example, in the Large Bitcoin Collider (LBC) project [7]. It is then important
to consider possible practical attacks on hash function in a middle-term horizon.
In this work, we consider a particular attack on cryptocurrency wallets based
brute-force search for digital signature secret keys that match addresses of ex-
isting wallets. We show that the success of the attack can be proven with high
probability and provide a lower bound for this probability. We also suggest a
modification of cryptocurrency networks that makes such an attack unprofitable
and also consider a mechanism that motivates users to announce the fact of hack-
ing their wallets by brute-force-type attack. These methods can be employed for
creating an additional security level for cryptocurrency network with the pos-
sibility to reveal and prove the fact of specific types of malicious transactions.
Our ideas are applicable for a general cryptocurrency model, however, we restrict
our consideration to the Bitcoin network. We expect that the generalization for
other cryptocurrencies can be rather straightforward.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we describe a brute-force-type
attack on cryptocurrency wallets. In Sec. 3, we demonstrate that if the attack
has been processed successfully then the fact of the brute-force-type attack can
be revealed with high probability. We also obtain a lower bound for the prob-
ability of proving the attack (obtaining the ‘evidence of the attack’). In Sec. 4,
we suggest a modification of consensus rules that makes such an attack unprof-
itable. The proposed mechanism is based on ‘freezing’ potentially stolen assets.
In Sec. 5, we demonstrate that it is possible to create a specific type of altruistic
transactions and corresponding smart-contract allowing honest users to collect
assets if he/she proofs that the assets from the wallet have been stolen in the
result of the brute-force-type attack. This creates a mechanism that motivates
users to announce the fact of hacking wallets by brute-force-type attacks in the
blockchain network. We then conclude in Sec. 6.
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2 Brute-force attack on Bitcoin wallets
We start our consideration of a brute-force attack with brief revising the con-
struction of Bitcoin wallets. Each Bitcoin wallet could be considered a set of
addresses, which are unique identifiers that are assigned to the possession of cer-
tain funds. The ownership of an address by a person corresponds to his knowledge
of the secret (also known as private) key that is used for the construction of a
corresponding address. We note that one person can have unlimited addresses.
Moreover, for the security reasons it is recommended to generate new address
after each withdrawing funds from an existing address.
2.1 Address generation
The construction of Bitcoin addresses is presented in Fig. 1. It is based on
employing elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [8] defined with
secp256k1 standard [9]. The address construction begins with a random genera-
tion of a secret key, which is a random string of 256 bits length. Despite a small
restriction on possible secret keys values, almost every 256-bit string corresponds
to a valid ECDSA secret key. Thus, the total number of possible secret keys is
given by Nsec ' 2256 ≈ 1.16× 1077. Then the public key is calculated using the
given secret key that is a computationally simple task for modern computing
devices. We note that the reverse operation of obtaining a secret key from the
corresponding known public one is assumed to be computationally infeasible for
existing computers.
secret key
public key
public key 
genereation
RIPEMD-160
SHA-256
public key hash
adding axiliarly
information
address
256 bit
268 bit
160 bit
200 bit
Fig. 1. Basic algorithm of the Bitcoin address generation.
The compressed version of the public key, that is a 268-bit string, then goes
through irreversible operations of hashing first with SHA-256 and then with
RIPEMD-160 cryptographic hash functions. As a result, one obtains a 160-bit
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string that is an essence of Bitcoin address. In practice, this hash is concate-
nated with 4 bytes of a checksum (obtained with doubled SHA-256) and an
additional version byte, and then the 25-byte (200 bit) result is represented with
Base58Check encoding [10] to obtain a final Bitcoin address. We note that the
transition between RIPEMD-160 hash and 200-bit address can be easily reversed.
Due to the intrinsic proprieties of cryptographic hash functions, which make
them operates as pseudo-random functions, the effective size of the address space
is given by Naddr ' 2160 ≈ 1.46 × 1048 that is far less than space size of the
possible keyspace Nsec. This feature plays a central role in our consideration.
Also, we remind that the security of employed cryptographic hash functions
must make it computationally infeasible to find any valid public key which gives
a particular 160-bit hash.
In what follows we consider only Pay-to-PublicKey Hash (P2PKH) transac-
tions. The idea behind this kind of transactions is that if a user would like to
transfer some funds to a particular address, he/she publishes a transaction of a
special form with an output containing the given address. In order to redeem the
funds, the owner of the address has to create another transaction with input con-
taining a public key, which hashes to the given address, and a signature, which
is created by using the secret key and corresponding public key. This signature
serves as a proof to the system that the author of the transaction is indeed the
owner of the address.
2.2 Attack description
Here we consider a particular type of a brute-force-type attack. The considered
attack is based on the exhaustive search strategy for the signature forgery attack
that is performed by an adversary intended to steal bitcoins from honest users.
1. The adversary makes a list AddrList of all the Bitcoin addresses which posses
some funds, using the current set of unspent transaction outputs (UTXO)
corresponded to the current state of the Bitcoin blockchain (we remind that
we consider P2PKH transactions only).
2. The adversary chooses a subset SKList in the space of all secret keys. This
subset is then used for checking over.
3. The adversary takes a secret key from SKList, generates a corresponding
address, and looks whether the obtained address is inside the set AddrList. If
this is the case, then the adversary publishes a transaction, which transfers
available funds from this address to some pre-generated address owned by
the adversary. This operation is repeated for all the secret keys in SKList.
The average rate of finding valid secret keys by the considered attack can be
calculated as follows:
R =
|AddrList|
Naddr
R0, (1)
where |AddrList| stands for the size of AddrList and R0 is the rate of repeating
the step 3 of the attack algorithm.
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We note that here we described only a general idea of the attack. Some
additional steps including updates of AddrList can be also considered. Also, we
would like to point out that this attack is implemented against all the users
possessing bitcoins rather than a particular user or address. From Eq. (1) one
can see that this fact increases the probability of the success in |AddrList| times,
that is at least a total number of people having Bitcoins at the current moment.
3 Proving the fact of a successful attack
We consider a scenario, where an adversary succeeded in implementing the brute-
force attack considered above and transferred funds from an address of a legiti-
mate user to some another address. We claim that this scenario drastically differs
from a scenario, where an adversary succeeded in stealing funds by unauthorized
access to the secret key of a legitimate user. The reason is a huge difference be-
tween the sizes of secret key space Nsec and address space Naddr. It turns out that
the same address can be generated to approximately Nsec/Naddr ∼ 1029 different
secret keys. Due to the fact that legitimate users (commonly) choose their secret
keys at random, in the case of successful attack with very high probability, the
secret key chosen by adversary will be different from the one belonging to the
legitimate user. This fact, in turn, leads to the difference between corresponding
public keys. Finally, a successful brute-force attack yields a revealing of collision
for RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(·)) function (see illustration in Fig. 2).
Space of public keys
Space of addressesLegitimate user
Adversary
Fig. 2. Basic idea behind the providing an evidence of successful brute-force attack:
With a high probability the public key of legitimate user will be different from the
presented public key of an adversary.
The important point is that the stealing transaction, which transfers funds
from the legitimate user address, essentially includes a public key that hash gives
this address. That is why the legitimate user, possessing another public key, can
in principle prove the fact of the successful brute-force by publishing his alterna-
tive public key together with the already published public key from the stealing
transaction. The observation of such the collision any user can make sure that
there was someone in the network who spent a huge amount of computational
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resources in order to find a valid secret key for the existing address. We call the
alternative public key, which gives the same address as some another public key,
the evidence of the brute-force attack (or the evidence for short).
Let us derive a rigorous estimation on the probability that in case of the
successful brute-force attack the evidence could be constructed. In our consid-
eration, we use the following assumptions. The first is that a legitimate user’s
secret key is generated with uniformly random distribution over the whole se-
cret keyspace. The second is that the action of RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(·)) hashing
satisfies the random oracle assumption [11]: Calculating a hash for every new
argument can be considered to be equivalent to a generation of a uniformly
random variable in the space of 160-bit strings.
We then consider an address and a corresponding subspace of secret keys,
which gives this address. Under the assumptions described above, the size of this
space is given by a random variable as follows:
N ∼ Bin(Nsec, 1/Naddr), (2)
where Bin(n, p) stands for the binomial distribution with number of trials n and
success probability p. The probability ε to obtain the same secret key as the
original secret key during the brute-force attack is as follows:
ε =
Nsec∑
n=0
1
n
Pr[N = n] < Pr[N ≤ n0] + 1
n0
Pr[N > n0] < Pr[N ≤ n0] + 1
n0
, (3)
where n0 is some positive integer less than expectation value Nsec/Naddr. We then
consider n0 in the form n0 := kNsec/Naddr with k < 1. According to Ref. [12],
the following upper bound on the binomial cumulative distribution function can
be used:
Pr[n ≤ N0] ≤ Nsec − kNsec/Naddr
Naddr(Nsec/Naddr(1− k))2 <
Naddr/Nsec
(1− k)2 . (4)
By substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (3) and choosing k := 0.36 providing an ex-
tremum value of RHS of Eq. (3), we obtain the following expression:
ε < 5.22×Naddr/Nsec < 7× 10−29 < 10−28. (5)
One can see that the obtained value indeed is negligibly small. Finally, we con-
clude that with probability larger than 1 − ε, that is extremely close to 1, the
legitimate user would be able to provide the evidence of the brute-force attack.
4 Diminishing attack motivation
As we discussed above, the presence of a successful brute-force attack, consid-
ered in Sec. 2, can be proven with the probability close to unity under reasonable
assumptions about the employed cryptographic hash functions and users behav-
ior. However, there is a particular issue about evidencing the attack presence.
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The problem is that there is no straightforward way to figure out whose of two
colliding public keys belongs to the adversary, and whose belongs to a legitimate
user. From the viewpoint of other users in the network both of the public keys
seem to be equivalent. We note that a time order in which these keys appear
also does not resolve the problem. One can think, that the first appeared public
key is a forged one, but the second, shown as evidence, belongs to the legitimate
user. However, the adversary can wait until the legitimate user publishes his
transaction and then disclose his public key as the evidence and claim that he
suffered from the attack.
Here we consider a solution which aims not to distinguish between legitimate
user and adversary, but to diminish the whole motivation of the brute-force at-
tack. This can be achieved by freezing funds transfer after an appearance of the
evidence of the brute-force attack related to these funds. The solution is based
on introducing two modification of the current Bitcoin protocol. The first modifi-
cation consists of introducing a new transaction type which contains evidence of
brute-force attack. We call it an evidence transaction. The second modification
is an introducing of timeout requirement between publishing a transaction and
spending funds from its outputs. This requirement is necessary to have enough
time to publish the evidence transaction to the blockchain before the stolen funds
will be spent (transferred to other probably legitimate users). Let us consider
the proposed modification in more detail.
4.1 Evidence transaction
The aim of the evidence transaction is to provide a possibility to present an
alternative valid public key to another public key used to transfer funds from
some P2PKH transaction(s) output(s). By alternative public key, we understand
a public key which hashes to the same address which we call a disputed address.
In contrast to standard cryptocurrency transactions, evidence transactions refer
not to the outputs, but to the P2PKH inputs of related transactions, which
call as suspect transactions. The outputs of the suspect transaction have to be
unspent, that should be provided by the second proposed modification. The
evidence transaction should contain alternative a public key corresponding to
the published key in related inputs of suspect transactions, and also provide an
auxiliary address, whose purpose will be discussed later.
If the evidence transaction got into blockchain, then the following operations
should be performed.
1. All the transactions that (i) contain P2PKH inputs with public key collid-
ing to public key presented in evidence transaction, and (ii) published in
blocks appeared not earlier than the oldest block containing suspect trans-
actions given in the evidence transaction, started to be considered as suspect
transactions.
2. All the outputs of the suspect transactions and all the outputs containing
the disputed address are removed from UTXO.
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3. Outputs of the transactions related to the inputs of the suspect transactions,
which do not contain a disputed address, turn back into an unspent state
(move back to UTXO).
4. An extra output is added to UTXO, which contains a number of bitcoins
given by the sum of funds on all the inputs of suspect transactions that have
a colliding public key and fees of the suspect transactions. These funds should
be able to be spent by publishing a transaction signed with the secret key
corresponded to the public key in the suspect transaction (giving a disputed
address), but can be only transferred to the auxiliary address given in the
evidence transaction.
The first three operations ensure that the funds taken from addresses which
were not hacked continue their circulation in the system. At the same time,
the funds from disputed address will be frozen, and the only way how they can
continue their circulation is their transfer by the author of suspect transactions
to the address given by the author of the evidence transaction. This scenario can
be realized if the author of the suspect transaction is “white hacker”, whose aim
is only to demonstrate the vulnerability of the system, but not to steal funds.
An important issue related to evidence transaction is its fee to miners. Since
the legitimate author of the evidence transaction probably no longer has any
coins after the suspect transaction is published, we propose to introduce an
extra reward for miners to add evidence transactions to the blocks (the evidence
transaction itself should bot contains any fee). The reward could be calculated
as a median value of total transaction fees in the last six blocks, and should be
added to the number of coins emitted in the current block.
4.2 Timeout requirement
Since the outputs of a suspect transaction should not be spent by the time
an evidence transaction is published, one need to introduce a timeout between
publishing a transaction and spending its outputs in subsequent transactions.
This timeout is necessary for providing the opportunity for the legitimate user
to react on unauthorized funds transfer and publish the evidence transaction.
In the Bitcoin network, it is recommended to wait until five blocks appear
on top of the block containing a particular transaction in order to be (almost)
sure that this transaction will not be removed from the blockchain. From this
perspective, the considered timeout can be selected at the same level of six
blocks. This choice, arguably, does not lead to a noticeable decrease in network
performance.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the considered approach of intro-
ducing an evidence transaction is applicable only in the case of the brute-force
attack presented in Sec. 2. It is not valid in the case, where the adversary is able
to find two valid secret keys giving a particular address at once.
Detecting brute-force attacks on cryptocurrency wallets 9
5 Rewarding the collision detection
Another option for dealing with brute-force attacks, which does not require any
changes in the present consensus, is introducing a reward for finding colliding
public keys. Obtaining the reward can be realized in automatic fashion by means
of creating a corresponding smart contract. It turns out that the Bitcoin script
language allows creating such kind of rewarding.
Consider the following Bitcoin output script (scriptPubKey):
OP OVER OP OPVER OP EQUAL OP NOTIF OP OVER OP HASH160
OP SWAP OP HASH160 OP EQUALVERIFY OP CHECKSIG OP ELSE
OP RETURN OP ENDIF
It can be interpreted as follows: “The funds from the output can be redeemed
by presenting a triple (sig1, pubkey1, pubkey2), where pubkey1 and pubkey2 are
two different public keys which give the same address, and sig1 is a valid signature
under the public key pubkey1. The fund from this output could be redeemed a
legitimate user, whose funds were stolen, or by the adversary, who obtained some
alternative public key.
The rewarding transaction can be published by anyone, who would like to
participate in the project of detecting the brute-force attack. Of course, the
information about the presence of rewarding transaction has to be somehow
spread among the community.
We also note that in presence of such rewards the adversary could include in
his list of addresses for which he would try to find a valid secret key (AddrList)
all the addresses without funds but with public keys published in the blockchain.
Unfortunately, if there were some funds on address whose public keys were pub-
lished, then the adversary could both steal the funds and obtain the reward.
Finally, we would like to make some remarks about why this kind of rewarding
is valuable for the whole Bitcoin blockchain system. The first reason is provid-
ing some automatic compensation for a person who suffered from a successful
brute-force attack. The second and more important one is that in the case when
someone redeems this reward, the whole network will obtain an important signal,
that the employed cryptography (particularly) hash functions have an evident
vulnerability or there is some participant (e.g. pool) which possess incredible
computational resources.
6 Conclusion
Here we summarize the main results of our work. We have considered a brute-
force attack on Bitcoin wallet which consists of finding secret keys for existing
addresses. We have demonstrated that if this attack succeeds then with a prob-
ability higher than 1 − 10−28 the legitimate user will be able to prove that it
was the brute-force attack. However, we also have shown that there is difficulty
determining who is a legitimate user and who is an adversary.
We have considered two possible approaches to dealing with a possible brute-
force attack. The first approach involves modifications in present consensus and
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allows to freeze stolen funds transfer. This approach allows diminishing attack
motivation since even if the adversary will succeed in implementing the attack,
with very high probability he will not be able to use the stolen funds. This
method may be used in developing a new cryptocurrency system.
The second approach does not involve any modification in the present Bitcoin
consensus, but propose to create special reward transaction, which allows getting
some coins as compensation to a person who suffered from brute-force attack.
More importantly, the fact of obtaining of this reward will serve as undeniable
evidence the cryptography employed in the current blockchain network has some
vulnerabilities. This kind of reward transaction could be added by any person
who wants to donate his coins to the project of detecting brute-force attacks.
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